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SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES  
ON XENO-POPULISM: AN INTRODUCTION
Introduction
In recent years, the vast production on populism and the political 
earthquake that democracies on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean 
are experiencing begins with the usual long list of political parties 
and movements that refer to this ideology, their electoral success 
and the growing consensus in public opinion.1 The strength of the 
neo-nationalist populist discourse appears to be inexorable and so 
do the various parties linked to it, extreme right, far right, populist 
radical right, which show the lack of clear definition and unitary 
definition of this ideological and political patchwork.2 
Trump’s election, the success of Brexit, the victories in the 
recent elections of the Lega party in Italy, the AFD in Germany, 
the Front National in France, Orban’s authoritarian government, 
in Hungary, the Law and Justice party in Poland, and the approval 
in the Netherlands and Denmark of the neo-nationalist parties 
are some of the empirical evidence on which an increasingly 
1 Ulrike M. Vieten, Scott Poynting, ‘Contemporary Far-Right Racist 
Populism in Europe’, Journal of Intercultural Studies, 37:6 (2016), 
533-540.
2 Manuela Caiani, Patricia Kröll, ‘Nationalism and Populism in 
Radical Right Discourses in Italy and Germany’, Javnost – The 
Public, 24:4 (2017), 336-354; see also Cas Mudde, Populist Radical 
Right Parties in Europe. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2007); Joost van Spanje, ‘The Wrong and the Right: A Comparative 
Analysis of “Anti-Immigration” and “Far Right” Parties’, 
Government and Opposition, 46: 3 (2011), 293-320; Jasper Muis, 
Tim Immerzel, ‘Causes and Consequences of the Rise of Populist 
Radical Right Parties and Movements in Europe’, Current Sociology 
Review, 67: 6 (2017), 909-939.
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important debate is being built.3 Although there are differences 
between these national experiences regarding electoral 
importance and influence on the political system as a whole, 
it is very clear that their ideological substratum tends to show 
multiple common points. The ones that are most discussed in the 
literature concern the strong xenophobic and anti-immigration 
policy, the law and order orientation, an anti-establishment 
and anti-globalization vision and a nativist ideology.4 The 
comparative interpretations of the new configuration of radical 
right-wing parties highlight a shared “core of ethno-nationalist 
xenophobia and anti-establishment populism”, which is flanked 
by “a general sociocultural authoritarianism that stresses issues 
such as law and order and family values”.5 
It could be said with an oxymoron that we are witnessing a 
sort of internalization of populist nationalism.6 In other words, 
3 Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe; Jans Rydgren, 
‘Immigration Sceptics, Xenophobes or Racists? Radical Right-wing 
Voting in Six West European Countries’, European Journal of Political 
Research, 47 (2008), 737-765; Vieten, Poynting, ‘Contemporary 
Far-Right Racist Populism in Europe’; Muis, Immerzel, ‘Causes 
and Consequences of the Rise of Populist Radical Right Parties and 
Movements in Europe’.
4 Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe; Kris Dunn, 
‘Preference for Radical Right-wing Populist Parties Among Exclusive-
nationalists and Authoritarians’, Party Politics, 21:3 (2015), 367-380; 
Yannis Stavrakakis and others, ‘Extreme Right-wing Populism in 
Europe: Revisiting a Reified Association’, Critical Discourse Studies 
14:4 (2017), 420–439; Roger Brubaker, ‘Populism and Nationalism’, 
Nations and Nationalism, 26:1 (2020), 44-66.
5 Rydgren, ‘Immigration Sceptics, Xenophobes or Racists?’, p. 241; see 
also Jackie Hogan, Kristin Haltinner, ‘Floods, Invaders, and Parasites: 
Immigration Threat Narratives and Right-Wing Populism in the USA, 
UK and Australia’, Journal of Intercultural Studies, 36:5 (2015), 520-
543; Thomas Greven, ‘The Rise of Right-Wing Populism in Europe 
and the United States’, Perspectives Report Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung 
Berlin, 2016.
6 Roger Brubaker, ‘Why populism?’, Theory and Society, 46 (2017), 
357-385; Brubaker, ‘Between Nationalism and Civilizationism. The 
European Populist Moment in Comparative Perspective’, Ethnic and 
Racial Studies, 40:8 (2017), 1196-1226.
A. Alietti, D. Padovan - Sociological Perspectives on Xeno-Populism  9
economic, social and multicultural globalization, considered as a 
negative factor, is contrasted by the globalization of populist and 
nationalist politics, which tends to reaffirm new identity closures 
and new borders. However, this political trend cannot be limited 
exclusively to the last decade. In the time span between the 
end of the 20th and the beginning of the 21st century, the same 
dynamics were present in the single Western societies. If, on the 
one hand, the acceleration towards this logic of government was 
achieved on the basis of the economic crisis and the so-called 
refugee emergency, in a sort of negative continuum, within 
the Western democracies there has always been the temptation 
of an authoritarian turnabout. In other words, the popularity 
of populism, to quote Taguieff,7 is a social and sociological 
phenomenon whose roots are well planted in the ground of the 
changes occurred. We consider it futile to search for a valid and 
exhaustive definition of a populist model, or a model of national-
populism able to recompose the different fragments with which 
the political declinations of this universe are expressed.8 The 
effort to understand the historical, empirical, theoretical and 
ideological variety of populisms, in a useful and valid typology, 
is very complicated.9 Our interest is not to retrace this wide 
and articulated debate, which is beyond our objective, but to 
highlight how xenophobic and exclusionary rhetoric is the central 
feature of this political dynamic called “populism”. We agree 
with Taguieff’s statement that “the only way to conceptualize 
populism is to designate a particular type of social and political 
mobilization, which means that the term can indicate only 
one dimension of political action and/or discourse […] It is a 
political style suitable for various ideological contexts”.10 From 
7 Taguieff Pierre-André, ‘La scienza politica di fronte al populismo: da 
miraggio concettuale e problema reale’, Trasgressioni, 3 (2000), 43-76.
8 Brubaker, ‘Populism and Nationalism’; Paul Taggart, Populism 
(Buckingham, UK: Open University Press, 2000); Margaret Donovan, 
Populism (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1981).
9 Ernesto Laclau, On Populist Reason (New York: Verso, 2005); Mudde, 
Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe; Nadia Urbinati, ‘The Populist 
Phenomenon’, Raisons Politiques, 51 (2013), 137-154.
10 Taguieff Pierre-André, ‘La scienza politica di fronte al populismo’, p. 43.
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the extensive literature we can draw a series of analyses aimed at 
defining the analytical boundaries of this concept, although it is 
controversial and slippery becoming a “catch-all word”.11
Populism as mobilization of xenophobic feelings
In the face of the evident difficulties of an ideal-typical 
generalization, it is indisputable that there are essential features 
that historically characterize populism, be it right or left. As 
far as we are concerned, we wonder whether one of these traits 
that distinguishes populism in its right-wing variant from other 
populist forms is racism in its different versions. On this point, the 
answer is not unambiguous. There are more exclusionary populist 
experiences, or more inclusive of ethnic minorities or immigrant 
communities. An example might be the political style of some leftist 
party, which expresses a populist style in its political discourse 
whereas at the same time it asks for a very inclusive politics for 
ethnic minorities. In this perspective it is a stretch to define it 
xeno-populist when compared with extreme right-wing positions. 
It seems quite clear to us that the renewed far-right populism is 
fundamentally nourished by a racist and xenophobic discursive 
strategy and administrative practice.12 This is the reason why we 
have decided to call this political model “xeno-populism” in order 
11 Alberto Martinelli, ‘Populism and the Crisis of Representative 
Democracy, in Martinelli’, in Populism on the Rise. A Challenge for 
Democracy?, ed. by Alberto Martinelli, ISPI, Milan, 2016, pp. 13-32; 
see also Taggart, Populism; Noam Gidron, Bart Bonikowski, ‘Varieties 
of Populism: Literature Review and Research Agenda’, Working Paper 
no. 13-0004. (Cambridge: Harvard University, Weatherhead Center 
for International Affairs, 2013); Cas Mudde, ‘The Populist Zeitgeist’, 
Government and Opposition, 39:4 (2004), 542-563; Cas Mudde, 
Kaltwasser Cristóbal Rovira, Populism: A Very Short Introduction 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017). As Stanley affirms ‘populism 
is a thin ideology; it is diffuse in its lack of a programmatic centre of 
gravity, and open in its ability to cohabit with other, more comprehensive, 
ideologies’ (Ben Stanley, ‘The Thin Ideology of Populism’, Journal of 
Political Ideologies, 13:1 (2008), 95-110., pp. 99-100).
12 Vieten, Poynting, ‘Contemporary Far-Right Racist Populism in Europe’.
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to capture more cogently its political and expressive strategies. In 
this sense, we are in line both with the Sivanandan definition of 
xeno-racism”13 and the idea of xenophobic populism suggested by 
Inglehardt and Norris.14 This anti-foreignness sentiment, this fear 
of strangers means at the same time defending and preserving “our 
people”, our way of life, our standard of living, and our “race”.15 
This xenophobia is a way to denigrate people before segregating 
or expelling them, “a feature of the Manichaean world of global 
capitalism, where there are only the rich and the poor […] The 
rhetoric of demonization is racist, but the politics of exclusion 
is economic: a prelude to creating a peripatetic underclass of 
international Untermenschen”.16 Moreover, this rhetoric of 
demonization is used to support, as suggested by Heitmeyer and 
Zick,17 forms of group-oriented enmity and a general attitude of 
rejection of strangers and all cultural or religious symbols and 
rituals that stem from them. This construction of the enemy implies 
not only their demonization, but also their dehumanization. Here 
“phobia” becomes racism because it transforms the bearer of a 
perceived threat into a racialized “Other”, where there is a strong 
continuity between ethnic characters and moral behaviour, where 
cultural differences are crystallized once for all.
The claim of primacy of the national community in the 
recognition and access of individuals to their rights clearly 
13 Ambalavaner Sivanandan, ‘Poverty is the New Black’, Race & Class, 
43:2 (2001), 1-6; see also Lia Fekete, ‘The Emergence of Xeno-racism’, 
Race & Class, 43:2 (2001), 23-40.
14 Ronald F. Inglehart, Pippa Norris, ‘Trump and the Xenophobic Populist 
Parties: The Silent Revolution in Reverse’, Perspectives on Politics, 
15:2 (2017), 443-54.
15 In the xeno-populism, analogously to the ethnopopulism outlined by 
Laclau, there is a tendency to set limits on the community; the ‘other’ is 
outside the community and in this sense minorities can survive within 
a defined territory, but marginality must remain their constant attribute, 
once the ‘ethnic principle’ has defined the limits of the community 
space (Laclau, On Populist Reason). 
16 Sivanandan, ‘Poverty is the New Black’.
17 Wilhelm Heitmeyer, Andreas Zick, ‘Anti-Semitism, Islamophobia 
and Group-focused Enmity in Germany’, Research Note, Institute for 
Interdisciplinary Research on Conflict and Violence. University of 
Bielefeld May 2004. 
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underlines that xeno-populism is a tool to achieve consensus 
by denouncing “illegal privileges unduly enjoyed by certain 
individuals”. In this frame, xenophobic rhetoric indiscriminately 
affects those people who do not “stay in their place” because they 
receive more than regular people – the honest working national 
citizens – regardless of whether they are migrants, criminals, 
bureaucrats, drug addicts or members of the financial élite, often 
represented by the figure of the Jew.18 
Here we see the chaotic discursive mix that characterizes 
populism, i.e. the fact that different subjects who have nothing to do 
with each other, and who are often at odds with each other, become 
the target of hostility and denigration. The logic of populism does 
not discern the different social subjects, but it groups them all in 
the same hotchpotch. As Mudde highlights, the success of xeno-
populist parties “was enabled by the pre-existence of a fertile 
breeding ground of popular resentment around immigration, crime 
and party politics across Western Europe”.19 But this discursive 
strategy that unifies a kaleidoscope of discriminatory meanings 
in the figure of the migrant has long been widely recognized. 
Traverso describes it very well: “the unifying element of this new 
extreme right resides in xenophobia, actualized in the rejection of 
immigrants”, where “the immigrant in our days is the heir to the 
‘dangerous classes’ of the 19th century, represented by the positive 
social sciences of the time as a receptacle for all social pathologies, 
from alcoholism to crime and prostitution, up to epidemics such as 
cholera” or, we can add, coronavirus.20 
The same discourse against the progressive and globalized 
élite tends to focus on the injustice represented by the alleged 
illegitimate aid given to the foreigner (immigrant and refugee) 
18 Yannis Papadopulos, ‘Il nazionalpopulismo nell’Europa Occidentale: 
un fenomeno ambivalente’, Trasgressioni, 25:3 (2000), 109-137.
19 Cas Mudde, ‘The 2012 Stein Rokkan Lecture. Three Decades of Populist 
Radical Right Parties in Western Europe: So What?’, European Journal 
of Political Research, 52 (2012), 1-19.
20 Traverso Enzo, ‘La fabrique de la haine: xénophobie et racisme en 
Europe’, Contretemps, 9 (2011) <https://www.contretemps.eu/la-
fabrique-de-la-haine-xenophobie-et-racisme-en-europe/>; Alfredo 
Alietti, Dario Padovan, Sociologia del razzismo (Rome: Carocci, 1999).
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rather than to the national citizen.21 However, in the literature it 
is possible to find examples of this new populism that identify 
the passage from a discriminatory and exclusionist will to a 
declared nationalist and nativist inclusion strategy. We move, as 
we have observed on other occasions22 from heterophobic racism 
to homophile racism, where the emphasis is on strengthening 
the ethno-national community and its borders at the expense of 
policies of hatred and exclusion that are less acceptable. In reading 
the political manifestos promoted by the main European extreme 
right parties, it emerges that “the essentialist ascriptions of race 
are unambiguously tractable in relation to the legal norms of 
citizenship”.23 Here the national or ethno-racial dimension tends 
to assume a renewed centrality in citizenship policies. As others 
scholars have highlighted, 
the radical right has increasingly gone beyond exclusionary populism 
to adopt a new form of cultural nativism, which, rather than promoting 
traditional right-wing extremist notions of ethnic and ethno-cultural 
superiority, aims at the protection of the indigenous culture, customs 
and way of life.24
“Cultural nativism” feeds a racial dimension that is based 
on well-known forms of differentialist racism understood in its 
meaning of irreconcilability between different cultures. The lack 
of phenotypic racial characters of people targeted by differential 
21 Brubaker, ‘Populism and Nationalism’; see also Stavrakakis, and 
others, ‘Extreme Right-Wing Populism in Europe’.
22 Alfredo Alietti, Dario Padovan, Metamorfosi del razzismo, (Milano: 
FrancoAngeli, 2005); see also Pierre-André Taguieff, La forza del 
pregiudizio, (Bologna: il Mulino, 1994).
23 Suman Gupta, Satnam Virdee, ‘Introduction. European Crises: 
Contemporary Nationalisms and the Language of “Race”’, Ethnic and 
Racial Studies, 41:10 (2018), 1747-1764, p. 1758.
24 Hans-George Betz, ‘Xenophobia, Identity Politics and Exclusionary 
Populism in Western Europe’, Socialisti Register, 39 (2003) <https://
socialistregister.com/index.php/srv/issue/view/440>, p. 195. For a 
discussion on “nativism”, its genealogy and relation with xenophobia 
see Anita Guia, ‘The Concept of Nativism and Anti-Immigrant 
Sentiments in Europe’, European University Institute Max Weber 
2016/20, 2016.
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racism makes this racism approach anti-Semitism. As suggested 
by Balibar,25 all the contemporary differential racisms can be 
understood from the formal point of view as generalized anti-
Semitism. For this reason, it is possible to understand the 
figure of the fanatic and intolerant Muslim as analogous to 
the dreadful, conspirator, outrageous Jew. Hence the further 
definition of “differentialist nativism”26 which highlights how 
xeno-populist parties and movements build their identities on 
the foundations of civic values that justify the exclusion of the 
foreigner considered culturally incompatible with the liberal 
freedoms of the Western societies.27 
A further rhetorical element concerns the claim of the risk of a 
progressive ‘ethnic replacement’ linked to migratory flows and, 
more recently, to flows of asylum seekers.28 Most of the times, this 
threat is represented in the statements of the various xeno-populist 
leaders with references to Islamic communities, alien to our model 
of civilisation. Islamophobia, in fact, is one of the fundamental 
points of the xeno-populist imagination, capable of arousing a 
broad consensus among the different strata of Western societies, 
also following the tragic events that have occurred in recent years.29 
A very important consequence of the growing electoral and xeno-
populist political force is the normalization of these exclusionary 
features and of the “Western supremacy” within public opinion. The 
25 Etienne Balibar, Immanuel Wallerstein, Race Nation Classe (Paris: 
Edition La Découverte, 1988).
26 Betz, ‘Xenophobia, Identity Politics and Exclusionary Populism’.
27 Pietro Gattinara Castelli, ‘Mobilizing Against “the Invasion”: Far 
Right Protest and the “Refugees Crisis” in Italy’, Mondi Migranti, 3 
(2017), 74-95.
28 About the relationship between “crisis” of refugees in Europe and 
the increase of xeno-populism see Elżbieta M. Goździak, Izabella 
Main, Brigitte Suter, eds, Europe and the Refugee Response A Crisis 
of Values? (London, New York: Routledge Studies in Development, 
Mobilities and Migration, 2020).
29 Enes Bayrakli, Farif Hafez, eds, European Islamophobia Report 2017 
(Seta Washington/Istanbul, 2018); Abdeslam Marfouk, ‘I’Am Neither 
Racist nor Xenophobic, But: Dissecting Attitudes Towards a Ban on 
Muslim’s Immigration’, Ethnic and Racial Studies, 42:10 (2019), 
1747-1765.
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“good reasons” for racism and the direct discrimination against all 
foreigners weaken the democratic structures that emerged after the 
IIWW, opening up to scenarios in which the authoritarian systems 
of government of uncertainty acquire legitimacy. Our attempt to 
highlight the racist component of populism as a strategic aspect of 
its success is also confirmed by the data that can be extrapolated 
from different international surveys.
As we have previously reported, the racist anti-immigration 
issues are the core message of the xeno-populist parties and radical 
right movements, framing immigrants as national and cultural 
threats, abusers of the generosity of welfare states of Western 
democracies, main cause of criminality, unemployment and so 
on.30 Various sources clearly show how an attitude of diffidence 
towards foreigners, especially Muslims, is widespread in Europe.31 
Furthermore, it is very clear how the voters of the xeno-populist 
parties absolutely opposed to the presence of ethnic minorities, 
Muslims, Jewish communities, refugees and asylum seekers. Here 
a sort of xenophobic continuum is evident in the opinion expressed 
by those subjects who are oriented to electorally support xeno-
populist parties and movements. For example, the research carried 
out by the PEW in 2016 shows a close relationship between voting 
for xeno-populist parties and the aversion to immigrants and multi-
ethnic society:
In the UK fully 64% of people who support the right-wing UK 
Independence Party (UKIP) say that a more racially, ethnically and 
nationally diverse society makes the UK a worse place to live. Only 
32% of Conservative Party adherents and 19% of Labour Party 
supporters share that view. In France, 51%, of those who feel closest 
30 Jans Rydgren, ‘The Sociology of the Radical Right’, Annual Review of 
Sociology, 33 (2007), 241-262.
31 Richard Wike, Bruce Stokes, Katie Simmons, ‘Europeans Fear 
Wave of Refugees Will Mean More Terrorism, Fewer Jobs’, Pew 
Research Center, 2016 <https://www.pewresearch.org/global/wp-
content/uploads/sites/2/2016/07/Pew-Research-Center-EU-Refugees-
and-National-Identity-Report-FINAL-July-11-2016.pdf>; FRA 
(European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights), EU-Midis Second 
European Union Minorities and Discrimination Survey (Luxembourg: 
Publications Office of the European Union, 2017).
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to the anti-immigrant National Front say increasing diversity is bad 
for France. Just 34% of supporters of the Republicans and 11% of 
Socialist Party adherents agree. In Germany 62% of people who have 
a favourable opinion of the right-wing party Alternative for Germany 
(AfD) believe Germany is worse off because of growing numbers of 
people with different racial, ethnic, and national identities. And in 
Sweden, 65% of the public that holds a favourable view of the anti-
immigrant Swedish Democrats voices the opinion that more diversity 
is making Sweden a worse place to live.32
With reference to this survey, the trend is confirmed by the 
identification of the attitude against the Islamic communities, 
which shows how the ideologically right-oriented voters are in a 
clear majority against them and, in particular, there is a substantial 
percentage difference with the left-oriented voters, which goes 
from a minimum of 15% in the UK and 18% in France to a 
maximum of 30% in Greece and Germany.33
This set of empirical evidence shows a clear trend on the political 
demand which finds its answer in xeno-populism.34 If we look 
at the political offer, in fact, it is equally clear that immigration 
and Muslim communities are dominant issues to gain electoral 
consensus. Among the many possible examples, Italy certainly 
represents a paradigm. The report “Barometer of Hate” published 
by Amnesty International has monitored the hate speech in the 
social profiles (Facebook and Twitter) of the candidates in the last 
electoral campaign in Italy. Most of the hate speech analysed came 
from Lega Nord (51% of statements) and Fratelli d’Italia (27%). 
Migration was the key issue of the collected data (91%), followed 
by the Islamophobic attitudes (11%). The main topics concern 
the typical stereotypes attributed to Islam and the figure of the 
Muslim: their invasion, too many mosques in the national context, 
the subordination/inferiorization of women and, most importantly, 
“the perception of Islam not as a religion, but as an imposition of 
its ‘own’ law and justice”.35
32 Wike, Stokes, Simmons, ‘Europeans Fear Wave of Refugees’.
33 Ibid.
34 Rydgren, ‘Immigration Sceptics, Xenophobes or Racists?’.
35 Amnesty International 2018, Conta fino a 10. Barometro dell’odio in 
campagna elettorale <https://www.amnesty.it/barometro-odio/>.
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The research carried out by VOX Italian Observatory for 
Human Rights on online hate speech, on the basis of the analysis 
of 215,377 tweets, shows that one negative tweet out of 3 is against 
immigrants and highlights its increase compared to previous 
surveys on tweets against Muslims and Jews.36 As Censis, an 
independent centre of social research, highlighted in its last 
annual report, the Italian society is experiencing a sort of “psychic 
sovereignism” defined by a closure, a retreat, and an intolerance 
towards diversity, especially Muslim communities. We can affirm 
that this condition is widespread inside the European societies, 
and it can feed a structural racism and discrimination at every 
level of collective life. From a report of FRA, published in 2017, 
it emerges that one out four (24 %) respondents felt discriminated 
against because of their ethnic or immigrant background in the 12 
months preceding the survey, and looking at the past five years, 
four out of 10 respondents (38 %) felt discriminated against 
because of their ethnic or immigrant background, skin colour or 
religion in daily life.37
Socio-economic crisis and crisis of the multicultural model
Generally speaking, the reasons for the return to national primacy 
and the rejection of the foreigner appear to be closely linked to the 
deep economic crisis of the last decade that has affected Europe, 
and to the sterile response of the European Union to the growing 
demands for inclusion, particularly of the working classes, which 
are most exposed to the effects of social polarisation. As it has been 
pointed out, the dominant public and political discourse about the 
financial crisis has been superseded by an “immigration crisis” and 
coevally an “EU crisis” and “disaffection has gradually come to be 
focused more on migration and immigrants than on neoliberalism and 
36 Vox. Osservatorio Italiano per i Diritti, La mappa dell’intolleranza. 4° anno, 
2019 <http://www.voxdiritti.it/wp-content/uploads//2019/06/190610_
VOX-Comunicato-mappa-2019_-completo-compresso.pdf>.
37 FRA, EU-Midis Second European Union Minorities and Discrimination 
Survey.
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austerity”.38 Undoubtedly, in this analysis we can find useful elements 
to understand the current situation. Specifically, it is evident how 
the most vulnerable fringes in certain national contexts – Italy is a 
significant example – have widely accepted the slogans of the xeno-
populist parties. The reduction of welfare resources, the progressive 
decay of citizenship rights, and job insecurity are the main factors 
that have opened the way to the social and electoral consensus of 
right-wing populism. Nevertheless, this interpretation may be largely 
reductive of the current situation. In fact, it should also be evaluated 
how in other nations less affected by the generalized crisis, there 
has been a growing consensus among extreme right-wing parties 
and movements: Germany, Holland, Denmark, Hungary, Poland are 
contexts in which the impact of the socio-economic crisis has been 
minor, or at least better absorbed, and, nevertheless, they too have had, 
at different levels, an incessant growth of populist and neo-nationalist 
ideologies. With reference to the typology proposed by Kitschel, this 
type of xeno-populism can be identified as “welfare chauvinism”, in 
which the resources of social protection and inclusion must function 
according to the principle of national preference.39
This means that we are facing a crisis of Western societies 
in their multicultural prerogatives which amplifies the possible 
repercussions of economic fragility in a negative way. It must be 
acknowledged that the current socio-political dynamics should 
not surprise us too much. For some time now, Europe has been 
plagued by xeno-populist tendencies that have been analysed and 
debated at least since the end of the 1970s, coinciding, first of all, 
with the decline of ideologies linked to workers’ and trade union 
struggles, and the social-democratic experiences that marked the 
post-war period or the famous “glorious thirty” and with the end 
of the so-called multicultural integration model.
The neoliberal turning point promoted by Thatcher and Reagan 
during the 1980s represents the point of no return of a policy marked 
by authoritarian populism, as defined and analysed by Stuart Hall in 
38 Gupta, SVirdee, ‘Introduction. European Crises’, p. 1750.
39 Herbert Kitschelt, The Radical Right in Western Europe: A Comparative 
Analysis (Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 1995), 
cit. in Papadopulos, ‘Il nazionalpopulismo nell’Europa Occidentale’.
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reference to the success of Thatcherism and its incarnation as a law 
and order society.40 In a previous work, Policing the crisis, edited 
by Stuart Hall himself and published in 1978, as Mellino correctly 
points out, it is clear that “in a historical context marked by national 
decline and economic stagnation, ‘governing the crisis’ becomes 
‘governing migration’, through a criminalizing construction of 
black populations as elements alien to cultural homogeneity and 
social order”.41 In this historical phase, a new long-term cultural 
hegemony is imposed, shifting the balance of social classes to 
the right, in other words “a reactionary common sense put at the 
service of practices and solutions of the radical right”.42 
Subsequently, between the late 1980s and early 1990s, the 
advent of populist politicians, such as Berlusconi and Bossi in 
Italy, leaders of Forza Italia and Lega Nord respectively, or the 
electoral successes of Haider in Austria and Le Pen in France, 
shows very clearly how long the process that has contributed to 
the current reality has been. According to Marco Tarchi, at the end 
of the 20th century the radical right embraced populism, creating 
the basis for a relatively cohesive political family on common 
programmatic bases, including a persistence on the fight against 
immigration, an emphasis on localism and territorial identities, 
and a claim against the partycracy.43 
The 2008 crisis aggravated the situation, functioning as a 
detonator of movements already present and widespread in 
European and North American societies. The growing insecurity 
connected to the presence of immigrant populations and the 
disruptive force of the flows of refugees and asylum seekers has 
favoured a shift towards a policy of law and order and a return 
to an “imagined community” that excludes ethnic diversity. The 
immigrant, often seen as a Muslim, becomes the central figure 
40 Stuart Hall, Politiche del quotidiano. Culture, identità e senso comune 
(Milano: Il Saggiatore, 2006).
41 Miguel Mellino, Governare la crisi dei rifugiati. Sovranismo, 
neoliberismo, razzismo e accoglienza in Europa (Rome: DeriveApprodi, 
2019), p. 19.
42 Hall, Politiche del quotidiano.
43 Tarchi Marco, ‘L’ascesa del neopopulismo in Europa’, Trasgressioni, 
XV:29 (2000), 3-22.
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of a social, political and economic drift which must necessarily 
be responded to with the closure and the putting on hold of the 
plural society.44 In a context of growing uncertainty and profound 
transformations of social, economic and political structures, the 
electoral base that supports the political discourse of xeno-populist 
parties is often identified in the so-called “globalization losers”, 
in particular white male working class citizens.45 As previously 
pointed out, “the anti-immigrant, racially tinged and anti-Muslim 
claims that are at the centre of most populist right platforms 
today are well configured to speak directly to people who fell 
that their social status is threatened”, a sort of “status anxiety”.46 
This analysis, which sees the capability of right-wing populism to 
emotionally capture the white working class “globalisation losers” 
as a fundamental strategy, could be bent towards the perspective 
of “productive populism”. As John Abromeit suggests
In producerist populist ideology, people are defined as virtuous 
producers and the enemies of the people as immoral parasites. One first 
notice that a friend-enemy logic is at work here, not unlike the one Carl 
Schmitt would later define as putatively essential to any truly political 
movement or ideology. This friend- enemy logic is specifically populist 
for two reasons. First, the “friend” is defined as the vast majority of the 
common and/or native members of the “people”. while the “enemy” is 
viewed as a minority elite who live among the people, but do not really 
belong to them and, in fact, exploit them and prevent them from 
realizing a harmonious and egalitarian community.47 
44 Gupta, SVirdee, ‘Introduction. European Crises’.
45 Noam Gidron, Peter H. Hall, ‘The Politics of Social Status: Economic 
and Cultural Roots of the Populist Right’, The British Journal of 
Sociology, 68 (2017), pp. S57-S84; Dietmar Loch, Ov Cristian Norocel, 
‘The Populist Radical Right in Europe. A Xenophobic Voice in the 
Global Economic Crisis’, in Europe’s Prolonged Crisis, ed. by Hans-
Jörg Trenz, Carlo Ruzza, and Virginie Guiraudon (London: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2015), pp. 251-269.
46 Gidron, Hall, ‘The Politics of Social Status’, p. 263; see also 
Alfredo Alietti, Dario Padovan, Metamorfosi del razzismo (Milano: 
FrancoAngeli, 2005).
47 John Abromeit, ‘Transformations of Producerist Populism in Western 
Europe’, in Transformations of Populism in Europe and Americas. 
History and Recent Tendencies, ed. by John Abromeit, Bridget M. 
Chesterton and York Norman (London: Bloomsbury, 2016), pp. 231-264.
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Moreover, the current instantiation of these oppositions shows 
labour as united with industrial and agrarian capital under the sign 
of “producers”. while the parasitic elements are identified chiefly 
as the agents of monetary institutions – the banker, the financier, 
the “money power”. and so on.48 The final step is the embodiment 
of such powers, which become the Jew or the European autocrat. 
What this analysis misses here is the targeting of the non-white 
labour, which is seen as the instrumental hand of parasitic agents. 
The Black labour is not only mobilized by the global capital or the 
finance, but it is in itself the enemy of the white-labour for it is 
unskilled and prone to the power of the élite.
Inglehart and Norris, in their analysis of contemporary neo-
populism, extend this producerist approach to wider living 
conditions, pointing out how the socioeconomic variant in the 
explanation of populist success is founded in the
“rising economic insecurity and social deprivation among the left-
behinds has fuelled popular resentment of the political classes. This 
situation is believed to have made the less secure strata of society – 
low-waged unskilled workers, the long-term unemployed, households 
dependent on shrinking social benefits, residents of public housing, 
single-parent families, and poorer white populations living in inner-city 
areas with concentrations of immigrants – susceptible to the anti-
establishment, nativist, and xenophobic scare-mongering exploited of 
populist movements, parties, and leaders, blaming ‘Them’ for stripping 
prosperity, job opportunities, and public services from ‘Us’.49
In addition to this socio-economic dimension – that doesn’t pay 
the due attention to the role that the labour status plays in the rise 
of populism – the authors place the cultural dimension side by 
side, highlighting how cultural backlash is the factor that shows 
the greatest connection with the propensity for xeno-populist 
voting, which is generally stronger among the older generation, 
48 Mark Loeffler, ‘Populists and Parasites: On Producerist Reason’, in 
Transformations of Populism in Europe and Americas.
49 Ronald F. Inglehart, Pippa Norris, ‘Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of 
Populism: Economic Have-Nots and Cultural Backlash’, Faculty 
Research Working Paper n16-026 (Cambridge: Harvard University, 
Kennedy School of Government, 2016), p. 2.
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men, the less educated, the religious, and ethnic majorities.50 
However, some reflections show that the general characteristics 
of the voters of xeno-populist parties are quite variable and that 
not always those with less cultural capital, the so-called “usual 
suspects”, constitute the hard core of the populist electorate. The 
case of support for Jobbik, for example, shows how it is significant 
among young and higher educated people51 The discussion, 
therefore, is differentiated and articulated in a connection between 
cultural elements that recall the properly ethnocentric and identity 
dimension, and socio-economic elements that determine a status 
of anxiety towards a situation of uncertainty and crisis. Basically 
we believe that it is right to highlight the connection of these 
xeno-populist vectors which seek “to exploit the anxieties and 
feelings of insecurity provoked by the socio-economic turmoil 
and ruptures associated with globalization and neoliberalism as 
well as the widespread ressentiments in response to the socio-
cultural transformation of Western European societies caused by 
the presence of a growing resident alien population”.52 
However, the theory of cultural backlash has to be compared 
with the fact that the attitude against immigration is not necessarily 
always present within a cultural frame, rather this negative feeling 
is associated with both cultural and economic variables, i.e. a value 
dimension associated with a material dimension. Consequently, 
it seems legitimate to observe that xeno-populist parties need 
“to mobilise voters concerned with the cultural as well as the 
economic impact of immigration, but the more numerous latter 
groups is pivotal in allowing the far right to extend its support 
beyond its secure voting base”.53 
50 Ibid.; Inglehart, Norris, ‘Trump and the Xenophobic Populist Parties: 
The Silent Revolution in Reverse’, Perspectives on Politics, 15:2 
(2017), 443-54.
51 Jasper Muis, Tim Immerzel, ‘Causes and Consequences of the Rise 
of Populist Radical Right Parties and Movements in Europe’, Current 
Sociology Review, 67:6 (2017), 909-939.
52 Hans-George Betz, ‘Xenophobia, Identity Politics and Exclusionary 
Populism in Western Europe’, Socialisti Register, 39 (2003) https://
socialistregister.com/index.php/srv/issue/view/440, p. 205.
53 Daphne Halikiopoulo, and Tim Vlandas, ‘What Is New and What Is 
Nationalist about Europe’s New Nationalism? Explaining the Rise of 
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Essentially, as it has resulted from the analysis on the impact of 
the 2008–09 financial and economic crisis, the cultural backlash and 
economic insecurity explanations are connected with each other, 
in other words economic insecurity has a direct impact on values 
and beliefs.54 Another significant empirical evidence highlights 
that in specific regions with an increase in unemployment are 
more likely to have a negative attitude toward immigrants, mostly 
because of their impact on the economy and not because of their 
alien cultural identity.55 
Therefore, it is always appropriate to evaluate how much 
the culturalist reduction is able to explain in its entirety the 
xenophobic feeling in its version of political demand of a part 
of society. It is quite clear that the prevalence of one factor over 
another, depending on the results of the research carried out, is not 
so decisive. In fact, an important moment of synthesis of xeno-
populism lies at the junction between the reaction to the economic 
crisis and its material consequences, and the production of a 
fictitious social and national cohesion based on the principle of 
the struggle between “us and them”.56 In an attempt to erase the 
social differences present in its consensual base, the xeno-populist 
ideology is configured, on the political offer side, as Gino Germani 
outlined some time ago, as a socio-psychological mobilization, 
which, however, does not alter even slightly the fundamental neo-
liberal economic and social structures.57 
It directly addresses the psychology of individuals disillusioned 
with representative democracy – such as members of the 
productive and petit-bourgeois classes – who feel apathetic and 
withdrawn from public space, offering them a new opportunity for 
the Far Right in Europe?’, Nation and Nationalism, 25:2 (2019), 409-
434, p. 425.
54 Yann Alagan, Sergei Guriev, Elias Papaioannou, Evgenia Passari, ‘The 
European Trust Crisis and the Rise of Populism’, Brookings Papers 
on Economic Activity (2017), 309-382; see also Gidron, Bonikowski, 
‘Varieties of Populism’.
55 Ibid.
56 See Caiani, Kröll, ‘Nationalism and Populism’.
57 Pasquale Serra, Individualismo e populismo. La destra nella crisi 
italiana dell’ultimo ventennio (Rome: Datanews, 1997).
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participation, albeit by other means.58 In this case the various xeno-
populist parties tend to emphasize the risk of the multicultural and 
multiethnic society both for its inability to assimilate differences 
and to brand the immigrant as an illegitimate subject of citizenship 
rights, especially when the material basis of such citizenship is 
challenged by the growing welfare state crisis or the economic 
crisis. The problem is that this psychological mobilization actually 
hides the impact of neoliberal policies in the production of 
inequalities by promoting the scapegoat policy.
In this vicious circle, a brief consideration on the role of the 
mass media and social networks is appropriate. On the one hand, 
in the past decades we have witnessed a process of “tabloidisation” 
of political discourse, which has intensified and nourished the 
properly emotional aspects of xeno-populist rhetoric, which 
dominated the political discourse in Europe in the past.59 As it has 
been rightly pointed out, this dynamic does not necessarily mean 
changing public attitudes and policy changes, it provides at the 
very least a more favourable ‘discursive opportunity structure’ 
for xeno-populist public discourses.60 Moreover, the traditional 
and new media discourse builds what we call the “xenophobic 
common sense” which normalises the resentment and racist 
attitudes in the public opinion.61 As it has been, a “certain type of 
Internet communication, spread globally by far-right politicians, is 
effective because it can involve people emotionally”, establishing 
a communication style that can be defined as “emotional 
antagonism”.62 The role of mass media and social networks is 
58 Ibid., p. 44.
59 Rydgren, ‘The Sociology of the Radical Right’.
60 Mudde, ‘The 2012 Stein Rokkan Lecture’; see also Ruud Koopmans, 
Paul Statham, ‘Ethnic and Civic Conceptions of Nationhood and the 
Differential Success of the Extreme Right in Germany and Italy’, in How 
Social Movements Matter, ed. by Charles Tilly, Doug McAdam and Marco 
Giugni (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), pp. 225-251.
61 Cinzia Padovani, ‘Lega Nord and Anti-Immigrationism: The Importance 
of Hegemony Critique for Social Media Analysis and Protest’, 
International Journal of Communication, 12 (2018), 3553-3579.
62 Giulia Evolvi, ‘Emotional Politics, Islamophobic Tweets. The Hashtags 
#Brexit and #chiudiamoiporti’, Partecipazione e conflitto, 12:3 (2019), 
871-897, pp. 872-873.
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fundamental in strengthening the “entrepreneurs of xenophobia”. 
Often, the “alchemy” consists in the transformation of normal 
situations of integration into risks, for example, of Islamisation 
of society or rhetoric of progressive “ethnic substitution” by 
uncontrolled migration.63 In this sense, the construction of “moral 
panic” joins with processes of “dehumanisation” of the foreigner/
migrant, particularly in the case of asylum seekers and Muslims. We 
are witnessing a “racist common sense” built by a strong relationship 
among extreme-right movements or right-wing mainstream 
parties, fundamentalist Catholics, newspapers and social media. 
In this frame, we can speak of a regime of “agnotology” promoted 
by these connections among political discourses, mass-media, 
and social networks which promote a regime of fake news in the 
post-truth era.64 This configuration legitimizes the xeno-populist 
vision of society, creating a real aversive climate and, overall, a 
“trivialization” of negative attitudes towards ethnic minorities and 
migrants. This articulated relationship is an important factor for 
the increase of xeno-populism in our contemporary societies and it 
highlights, paraphrasing the statement of Mudde, the change from 
“normal pathology” of racism to its “pathological normalcy”.65 
The racialized structure of global populism 
We have so far suggested that the strength of right-wing 
xeno-populism feeds on different strategies of mobilization 
that combine: on the one hand, a productivist perspective in 
defense of honest workers, on the other hand, a radical idea of 
national nativism capable of identifying an enemy consisting of 
an elusive alliance between money parasites and unskilled and 
dishonest work. This image immediately becomes racist when 
63 Alfredo Alietti, Dario Padovan, ‘Islamophobia in Italy. National Report 
2018’, in European Islamophobia Report, ed. by Enes Bayrakli, and 
Farif Hafez (Seta Washington/Istanbul, 2019).
64 For an interesting research on emotional antagonism by the political use 
of tweets in UK and Italy see ibid.
65 Cas Mudde, ‘The Populist Radical Right: A Pathological Normalcy’, 
West European Politics, 33:6 (2010), 1167-1186.
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this enemy from an initial abstract elaboration is reduced to its 
concrete components: the Jew (and its poor variant: the gypsy), 
the African immigrant, the refugee and the Muslim. Racism, 
therefore, presents itself as the main competitive advantage of 
right-wing populism over left-wing populism, an aspect that is 
often forgotten. The logic of the internal enemy is connected 
to the logic of the external enemy ready to invade the fatigued 
and weak Western and European democracies. There is, as said, 
a polarized opposition between us and them in both horizontal 
and vertical terms.66 From the vertical point of view, there is the 
opposition between the élite and the common people, declined in 
the notion of the “people without voice”; the horizontal dimension 
is expressed in the conflict between insiders and outsiders, 
between those who are members of a supposedly cohesive 
national community and those who do not share it, given their 
status of foreigners. Moreover, the issue of impersonal forces 
or institutions assessed in their threat, such as the European 
Union, globalization, Islamic radicalism, always applies to this 
dimension. The negative representations of Muslim immigrant 
communities and the Jew, as a typical figure of hidden global 
power, are part of this polarity. 
This projection is associated with the conspiracy speech that 
accompanies much of the anti-Semitism on the basis of the classical 
arsenal on which the image of the Jewish conspirator was founded 
to the detriment of the national communities which are victims of 
their secret and international plots. The figure of Soros has become 
in the universe of neo-Nazi and neo-fascist movements and groups 
in Europe the symbol of the return to the traditional anti-Semitism, 
in its sense of threat for national white communities. In this sense, 
the idea that the humanitarian reasons promoted by the Hungarian 
magnate in favor of refugees and asylum seekers is a mean to 
destabilize our social order and put our civilization at risk, is a 
conspiracy strategy.67 It is no coincidence that, for example in the 
Italian context, this hegemonic racist representation is connected 
66 Taguieff Pierre-André, ‘La scienza politica di fronte al populismo’.
67 Reportedly understood by Tarabant Micheal chapter 4 infra; see also 
Brubaker, Brubaker, ‘Populism and Nationalism’.
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to a continuous devaluation of democratic civil society, NGOs 
and part of the Catholic Church, including the figure of the Pope, 
involved in the integration and in interfaith dialogue.68 
The racism violently expressed by xeno-populism against 
Jews, Gypsies, Negroes and Muslims is not only a subjective 
and voluntary product of current populism, but an element that 
has characterized the formation of geo-capitalism on a historical 
level.69 The rhetoric of improvement and development of the 
human condition, that has accompanied the global expansion 
of capitalism, shatters against the racist cliffs that have risen in 
its shadow. Geo-capitalism in its formation equips itself with a 
global racial system.70 The modern global racial system, made 
of a mixture of different ‘racial projects’, such as anti-Semitism 
and Afro-racism, arose during the building process of industrial, 
colonial and financial capitalism and the Western nation-
states supporting it. Antisemitism was at the core of European 
nationalization based on the twofold process of nation-building 
and state-building, 71 whereas afro-racism – after the end of slaves 
trading – was at the core of Western colonial domination.72 Both 
racisms – Afro-racism and Antisemitism – were at the core of the 
global process of modernization, the first one representing the 
bare labour-force, the second one representing the naked money; 
the first one having to do with the ground-rent, the second one 
with the money-interest, two different forms of capital. In this 
erratic system of production and circulation of commodities and 
68 Alietti, Padovan, ‘Islamophobia in Italy. National Report 2018’; 
Alfredo Alietti, Dario Padovan, ‘Islamophobia in Italy. National Report 
2017’, in European Islamophobia Report, ed. by Enes Bayrakli, and 
Farif Hafez (Seta Washington/Istanbul, 2018).
69 See Alietti, Padovan, ‘Islamophobia in Italy. National Report 2018’.
70 Winant Howard, The New Politics of Race: Globalism, Difference, 
Justice (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2004).
71 George Mosse, Toward the Final Solution. A History of European 
Racism (New York: Howard Fertig, 1978); Zygmunt Bauman, 
Modernity and the Holocaust (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1989); Balibar, 
Wallerstein, Race Nation Classe.
72 See on this George M. Fredrickson, Racism: A Short History (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2002); see also Theo D. Goldberg, Racist 
Culture (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1993).
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value,73 racism plays again a crucial role, as a common sense 
marker for social and labour positions embodied in the racialized 
order of geo-capitalism.74
This global order is nowadays apparently shaken by blurred 
attempts to come back to a more nationalized and de-globalized 
order – this is just the aim of the current populisms – but it is 
clear that this process triggered by ‘white’ and ‘developed’ 
nation-states is in no way a challenge to global capitalism and 
that it has nothing to do with democracy, equality, freedom, 
solidarity, development. Xeno-populism, that as we have 
seen, has become a successful political weapon in the hands 
of cynic fascist minorities, can be seen as the national variant 
of the global racism that embraces the planet. The widespread 
institutional discrimination promoted by these countries ruled 
by xeno-populist parties are not accidental consequences of 
legitimate reactions to a blind and strongly unequal globalized 
order, but the pitiless transformation of long-time processes of 
exploitation and dispossession of natural and human wealth 
from the poorest areas of the planet. These processes, clearly 
footed on an old-style racial nationalism,75 aim perhaps to re-
establish the lost centrality of the world-system’s core countries 
challenged by the emerging countries, or simply to avoid the 
social consequences of the ecological degradation of many areas 
of the planet. However, the so-called ‘refugee crisis’ is hiding 
something more. Here, the game is changing its rules: the time of 
a hypocrite semi-free circulation of human labour, often coupled 
with raw materials and primary goods flows76 is coming to an 
end. At the beginning, the flows of migrants were generated by a 
73 Chris Harman, Zombie Capitalism (Chicago, Illinois: Haymarket 
Books, 2010).
74 See on this point for example Herbert Blumer, ‘Race Prejudice as a 
Sense of Group Position’, The Pacific Sociological Review, 1:1 (1958), 
3-7; Michael Banton, Race Relations (London: Tavistock, 1967); 
Robert Miles, Malcom Brown, Racism (London: Routledge, 2003).
75 Balibar, Wallerstein, Race Nation Classe; Michel Foucault, Society 
Must Be Defended (New York: Picador, 2003).
76 Douglas S. Massey, and others, ‘Theories of International Migration: 
A Review and Appraisal’, Population and Development Review, 19:3 
(1993), 431-466.
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demand of cheap labour-force to be employed in the production 
processes. Subsequently, the flows of people have become 
refugees escaping from political, economic, environmental, and 
social crises (often taking the form of local armed conflicts or 
natural disasters), which are now seen as to be destabilizing 
the internal order of affluent – but no more growing – countries 
and thus they need to be stopped. Here, racism, populism and 
migrations enter a lethal circularity. As noted by Miles and 
Brown, there is “a dialectical relationship between migration 
and racism […] in the longer term, racism begets migration, 
which begets racism which begets migration and so on”.77 Thus, 
Western societies are re-discovering their mythical racial origins, 
and the racial enemies – inside and outside – threatening them. 
Affluent societies begin to build concrete boundaries (walls) 
keeping out their enemies (or internally segregating them),78 and 
claiming the right of the sovereign power to defend them. The 
figure of the climate-change migrant, for instance, expresses a 
set of ‘white’ anxieties having to do with an impending loss of 
control and disorder, and the dissolution of boundaries.79 Racism 
is in fact a strong tool to build cleavages and walls into social 
bodies as stressed by Foucault. In the perspective of global xeno-
populism, dynamics of racialization such as the discrimination 
against minorities in order to exploit their labour or to exclude 
them from social benefits underlined by a number of scholars,80 
are taking two converging dynamics: on the one hand, the global 
economy generates local regimes of racialization in which 
targets of discrimination practices change depending on the race, 
ethnic origin, religion, cultural descent; on the other hand, the 
77 Miles, Brown, Racism, p. 137.
78 Saskia Sassen, ‘A Massive Loss of Habitat’, Sociology of Development, 
2:2 (2016), 204-233.
79 W.A. Baldwin, ‘Resilience and Race, or Climate Change and the 
Uninsurable Migrant: Towards an Anthroporacial Reading of “race’”’, 
Resilience, 5:2 (2017), 129-143.
80 See for example Stephen Castles, ‘Racism: A Global Analysis’, Centre 
for Multicultural Studies, University of Wollongong, Occasional Paper 
28, 1993; Miles, Brown, Racism; Edna Bonacich, Sabrina Alimahomed, 
Jack B. Wilson, ‘The Racialization of Global Labor’, American 
Behavioral Scientist, 52:3 (2008), 342-355.
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global economy system reproduces a ‘global apartheid’ whereas 
different places are marked by the same abstract racial order.81
Racism is thus ‘a potential element of signification by which to 
select, and to legitimate the selection of a particular population, 
whose labour power will be exploited in a particular set of unfree 
production relations’.82 The people identified as the source of 
unskilled exploitable labour power are also constructed and 
treated as an inferior race. Class formation and race formation 
here merge: the creation of the partially dispossessed labouring 
class is not only motivated by racism, but it is effected through 
a series of mechanisms pushing these people into an increasing 
segregated system.
The articulation of capitalism, by enabling and maintaining 
the connection between everyday reproduction processes and 
the global production of value, is essential to the perpetuation 
of global racism. This latter is thus the cruel flag of a new stage 
of the appropriation of resources – in the form of land grabbing 
and ground rent – while people must be chained to their deprived 
land. People left to die in these deserted lands or into the shadowy 
seas that they try to cross, constitute the spectral materiality of the 
global processes of dispossession, the material dimension of an 
order of inequalities.
The hidden components of xenophobic society 
This global racialized order and the global xeno-populism that 
constitutes its material and political weapon, are indicators of the 
fact that during the last decade societies have not moved towards 
a stage of profound and widespread well-being, free from conflict, 
hostility, exclusion, discrimination. Racism and racial local orders 
have re-emerged from the deep of ultramodern western societies 
with surprising and worrying virulence, as we have tried to show 
81 Smith John, ‘Imperialism and the Law of Value’, Global Discourse, 2:1 
(2011) <http://global-discourse.com/contents>.
82 Miles, Brown, Racism, p. 129; Paul Gilroy, There Ain’t no Black in 
the Union Jack’: The Cultural Politics of Race and Nation (London: 
Hutchinson, 1987).
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so far. As mentioned above, forms of anti-Semitism and anti-
Islamism reappear in unexpected contingencies, acquiring a new 
and unexpected centrality for the social mobilization of people 
promoted by xeno-populisms. These waves of hostility and racism 
that follow each other at the dawn of the 21st century testify to 
the many fears that crowd the horizons of advanced societies, 
undermining not only their internal coherence, but the democratic 
structures themselves. 
The xeno-populism (and the racism that constitutes its filigree) 
we are facing is liquid, transitive, highly mobile, generically 
oriented against all foreigners. But notwithstanding its liquidity, 
this racism works as social bond for scared and isolated people. And 
it asks for subordinated assimilation and instantly recognizable 
inferiorization of Others, putting them on the last rung of an 
imaginary social ladder. This desire to subordinate the Other is 
strictly linked with the combination of forms of authoritarianism, 
ethnocentrism and anomie, which is embracing most of European 
societies and political arena. Here lies the thrust for the drive 
towards coercive assimilation, through the adoption of a number 
of measures, which include the recasting of citizenship laws 
according to security considerations.
According to these underlying assumptions, research 
shows that xeno-populism is the result of three large collective 
phenomena or conditions that mark our society.83 Firstly, a 
widespread ethnocentrism and nationalism, which seems to feed 
a strong national or regional or ethnic identity, is present in a 
large proportion of respondents. We argue that the ethno-national 
identity is a circumstance that favours the occurrence of prejudice. 
At the same time and in a recursive or circular logic, the anti-
Semitic and anti-Muslim prejudice contributes to national unity 
in a classical dynamic based on the identification of a threatening 
out-group. Secondly, a widespread authoritarianism, which 
is a reaction to anxieties and insecurities both individual and 
83 Alfredo Alietti, Dario Padovan, ‘The Racialization of Public Discourse’, 
European Societies, 14:2 (2012), 186-202; Alietti, Padovan, ‘Religious 
Racism. Islamophobia and Antisemitism in Italian Society’, Religions, 
4 (2013), 584-602.
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collective. Under conditions of particular uncertainty and social 
fragmentation, authoritarianism becomes a flight “from freedom” 
and from the individual and collective responsibility; it crystallizes 
in punitive attitudes and an obsessive request for compliance. In 
the same recursive perspective first outlined, authoritarianism 
enters into a relationship of “reciprocal causality” with prejudice, 
making this latter a functional substitute for the social and 
juridical covenant that should ensure social harmony and social 
cohesion. Racism is thus not only the source for new social ties, 
but also a tool to deal with the crisis of the rule of law. Here lies 
the thrust for the drive towards assimilation. Assimilation is being 
forced through by the adoption of a number of measures, which 
include the recasting of citizenship laws according to security 
considerations; the introduction of compulsory language and 
civics tests for citizenship applicants; codes of conduct for the 
trustees of mosques; a cultural code of conduct for Muslim girls 
and women who, in some areas of Europe, are forbidden to wear 
the hijab in state schools and other public institutions. Finally, a 
widespread situation of anomie, or social uncertainty and distrust, 
which feeds the prejudice and produces the conditions for racism, 
is the starting point for new forms of social solidarity, backed now 
on an aggressive but short-lived ethno-racial identity. In this case 
we have split up anomie in two diverging dimensions: distrust of 
the future and distrust of society, alluding the former to a condition 
of complete uncertainty toward the near upcoming individual and 
familiar condition; the latter referring to a contingent situation of 
absence of social supports and solidarity. In all three cases there is 
clear evidence that the lower the cultural capital and social status, 
the stronger the authoritarian, ethnocentric and distrust attitudes.
The current xeno-populism or the dynamic combination of 
racism and populism that hides behind phenomena such as social 
insecurity, or at the back of discourses such as the authenticity of 
cultures and their natural hierarchies, is very different from the 
explicit racism of the early twentieth century, but it is quickly 
becoming a common sense which is already part of the public 
discourse. To battle it we need subtle and insightful tools, able 
to deconstruct the self-evident argument as to who is racist, and 
to pierce the veil of ignorance that envelops the racists – “by 
A. Alietti, D. Padovan - Sociological Perspectives on Xeno-Populism  33
choice” and “by chance” – and the anti-racists who want to fight 
them. More appropriate then, would be a more courageous and 
compelling critique of the political ideologies and institutional 
practices that often fuel hostility.
The content of the book
This collection shows different points of view regarding the 
issues here announced.
Jack Jacobs illustrates how the “Critical Theory” of the so-
called Frankfurt school is still useful to understand current 
phenomena such as the xenophobic populism exhibited by 
Donald Trump and the greatest part of Us Republicans. Jacobs 
also shows that the contemporary phenomenon of antisemitism 
without Jews – for example, in some parts of Eastern Europe, 
such as Poland – suggests that the approach taken by the Critical 
Theorists to antisemitism on this issue is still valid. Trump is 
not a conscious anti-Semite, but he uses discourse techniques 
acquired from anti-Semite tradition. What Jacobs underlines is 
that the strategy used by Trump public discourses directed against 
Muslims, Mexicans and others, is Antisemitic in its on essence. 
This strategy is composed, according to Jacobs, of three different 
aspects: interchangeability of victims; mechanisms of agitators 
for propaganda: personalisation, emphasis on means, not on 
ends, the role of conspiracy; the negation of prejudices. What is 
very crucial here is the fact that Jacobs uses the tools of Critical 
Theory of Horkheimer, Adorno, Lowenthal, and others, to shed 
light not on the past antisemitism, but on the current strategies 
of xeno-populism here represented by Donald Trump discourses 
and propaganda. It is worth underlying here that many other 
populist leaders are using the same discourse techniques against 
their own enemies and victims. These are precious insights, not 
only to understand but also to battle against these new forms of 
racist populism. The chapter of Stephen Pogany focuses on the 
strategy of Orbán and his party Fidesz to consolidate their power 
over Hungarian society. Also here, xeno-populism – oriented both 
in religious terms, such as islamophobia and antisemitism, and 
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anti-immigrant claims and policies – is portrayed as one of the 
pillars of the new-conservative and semi-fascist Orban’s regime. 
The chapter of Pogany underlines the historical basis of Hungarian 
anti-Semitism, anti-communism and finally islamophobia. As 
he states, in the transition from communism, “radical right-wing 
elements began to assert that Jews had exercised enormous power 
and influence in communist Hungary. As so often, classic anti-
Semitic tropes of Jewish dominance, unbridled ambition, lack 
of patriotism and collusion with foreign interests proved more 
compelling than mere facts”.
The chapter by Richard Chapman discusses the so-called 
Windrush Scandal. Empire Windrush is the name of the first 
ship that brought Afro-Caribbeans to UK from the former 
English colonies that landed at Tilbury Docks in 1948. The 
Empire Windrush soon became part of a significant historical 
and sociological debate, adding a substantial expressive meaning 
linked to connotations of mass immigration, the creation of 
Afro-Caribbean communities in the United Kingdom, and, by 
the 1990s, a largely positive association of the first ship arriving 
from the West Indies as the first step into what was perceived as a 
successful process of integration into modern British society. The 
article detailing describes the slow but systematic dismantling 
of the multi-cultural model of cohabitation between people of 
different origin and culture. The “Operation Vaken” is perhaps the 
most notorious (and revealing) example of the UK government-
sponsored creation of hostile discourse against immigrants. The 
Windrush Scandal with its incredible “Operation Vaken” falls 
into what we may call a discourse of racist dishonesty. There are 
four main aspects to this linguistic contribution to a truly hostile 
environment. Firstly, the use of euphemisms is a constant in the 
discourses surrounding immigration. The second aspect of the 
racist discourse is, on the other hand, precisely the opposite: an 
attempt to ‘up the ante’ linguistically in order to garner support 
by the Conservative Party and its government. A third, and most 
striking, aspect is the repeated use of de-humanising vocabulary 
in discussion of the ‘immigration threat’. The fourth element in 
this hostile discourse is to be seen in the tendency to place nouns 
referring to immigrants in proximity to adjectives indicating their 
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dishonesty or criminality. At the end, Operation Vaken shows 
that “Windrush generation” suffered so much precisely because 
this is only the final chapter in countless years of discrimination. 
The Windrush generation, for all the romantic descriptions of 
successful integration, were perhaps always second-class citizens 
in some ways, and their lack of financial and political clout after 
so many years cost them dear.
Zbyněk Tarant’s chapter aims to enlighten the “pro-Israel” 
and “philosemitic” political attitudes of right-wing populism 
in Hungary, Czech Republic and so on. Focusing on the Czech 
Republic case, it provides a description of the paradoxical 
relationship between the Czech right-wing populist scene and 
Jewish affairs. It investigates the ideological background of these 
parties and movements, explaining the rationale behind some of the 
paradoxes. It discusses the implications of the right-wing populist 
policies for the security and well-being of the Jewish communities 
in the country. Finally, its core argument is that in order to 
understand the “pro-Israel” far-right claims we need to understand 
the far-right’s thought and its political strategy, based mainly on 
the category of “ethnopluralism”. Coined by the theorist of body 
culture and far-right environmentalism Henning Eichberg in 1973, 
the term ethnopluralism was later adopted by the French far-right 
political philosopher Alain de Benoist as part of the Nouvelle 
Droite (“New Right”) ideological concept. Ethnopluralism calls 
for “right to difference” by means of “diversity on the global 
scale”, yet “preservation of ethnic homogeneity on the regional 
level” as a necessity for maintaining this global diversity. As 
a matter of fact, all ethnic groups are seen as nominally equal, 
according to this ideology, as long as they remain in their native 
region or territory. At the end, Tarant’s chapter raises the question 
whether Israel will maintain the hopes of Czech right wing to fight 
Muslims and Islam, and if not, what the reaction of the alleged 
supporters of Jews and Israel might be. Even if some right-wing 
movements today express pro-Israel and philosemitic sympathies, 
they still think in conspiracist frameworks, and it cannot leave 
Jews and Israel very serene.
Ireneusz Krzeminski’s chapter analyses direct relationship 
among nationalism, populism and racism by the analysis of various 
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empirical researches carried out in Poland. The author identifies 
in the national feelings and ideological views the postulate called 
“proper treating” of the very own citizens facing the flows of 
refugees and migrants who “when coming, are demanding a lot for 
themselves”. On the basis of national, populist political ideology it 
is possible to highlight the process of the activation and mobilization 
of people against actual democracy. There are hidden authoritarian 
tendencies under the national, populist ideology by the politicians, 
who criticize the “unjust” elements of actual democracy. This 
dynamic of the demolition of polish democracy is easier when it 
is supported by religious institutions, such as the Catholic Church. 
In this perspective, the author shows another significant factor: the 
Polish kind of religiosity, ow/here? connected with the national 
tradition of Polak – katolik, favours rather not friendly attitudes to 
people of other religions. In any case, it is important for populist 
decision, particularly in Poland, to create a strong connection 
between the image of danger and the great wave of people coming 
to, or even invading Europe from Africa and Middle East, who are 
a threat to “our” culture. This has been the most important element, 
opening nations toward xenophobic and nationalistic views, and 
attitudes. At least/finally, the analysis highlights as the structure of 
the Islamophobic attitudes are basically analogous to the structure 
of the anti-Semitic attitudes. So, it is possible to articulate the 
hypothesis that the image of Jews as a conspiracy group in “our” 
nation becomes “a model for anti-Muslim, Islamophobic attitudes 
and views”.
Drawing on the work of heterodox Marxian critical theorists 
such as Moishe Postone, Matt Bolton and Frederick Harry Pitts’ 
chapter suggests that the notion of capitalism as a ‘rigged system’ 
imposed by a minority of wealth extractors on ‘the many’ carries 
potentially troubling resonances. Pushed to its limits, such a 
depiction can nurture the development of an antisemitic worldview. 
This is particularly so when it is combined with a Manichean ‘anti-
imperialist’ politics that attributes all that is wrong in the world 
to the actions of the USA and the very existence of Israel, and 
thus offers support to, and seeks to build political alliances with 
any movements claiming to oppose ‘the imperialists’. regardless 
of that movement’s own reactionary political, social and, in some 
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cases, antisemitic character. Bolton and Pitts’s chapter begins with 
the idea that traditional Marxism sees capitalism as “a monolithic 
system consciously designed and covertly imposed by one group 
– be it the ‘capitalist class’. the ‘bourgeoisie’ or the ‘élite’ – upon 
another – whether ‘workers’ or ‘the people’”. According to the 
authors that follow Moishe Postone’s works, this vision fails to 
grasp what is meant by capitalist society. Capitalism is not in its 
essence a gang of “immoral or corrupt individuals or groups”, 
even if it is also possible as history teaches us, but “a specific 
historical set of human social relations, centred around the 
production of wealth as the peculiar form of ‘value’”. Capitalism 
is an “automatic subject” aimed to generate value, but value 
“exists as a social relation between objects, which is validated 
as such at the moment those objects are successfully exchanged 
with one another”. This process of value-production or of capital 
self-valorisation “compels everyone – rich and poor, capitalist 
and worker – to behave in certain ways in order to survive, even 
whilst one group benefits at the other’s expense. Companies have 
to compete to make a profit in order to avoid going bankrupt. This 
is a compulsion, not a choice”. Authors here share a perspective 
coming from Moishe Postone but also from others, such as the 
Wertkritk launched by Robert Kurz who strongly criticized any 
sort of personalization in the critique of capitalism. Corbynism 
promotes just the opposite: in its view, the idea of a parasitical, 
unproductive aristocratic class that exploits workers is dominant. 
But the authors suggest using the words of Anselm Jappe, “it 
is, precisely, a ‘truncated’ critique”. In other words, without an 
adequate theoretical framework for grasping the strange and 
unpredictable dynamics of capitalist society, “partial forms of 
anti-capitalism on the left leave themselves open to reactionary 
or regressive outcomes, including antisemitism, authoritarian 
nationalism, or fascistic theocracy”.
The final chapter by Claudia Dina Hassan investigates the rise 
of populism in the frame of the crisis of democracy, asking for 
antibodies that must be built to cope with it and its racist, xenophobic 
and antisemitic manifestations. It starts with the very crucial 
question: what links all these different types of populism, wherever 
they are in the world? Hassan suggests that its indeterminate nature, 
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disintermediation, detachment from the classes traditionally in 
power and the creation of a state of “us and them” are all common 
to the various types of populism. All populisms, starting from the 
construction of a new grammar and syntax, from the desire to build 
a new symbolic universe of reference, break away from a certain and 
given system to create contexts of anticipation and changes within 
an indefinite outcome. According to Hassan thought, all populisms 
share common features. The first one consists in the inability of 
populism to distinguish between the people, the electorate and 
the nation; the second one sees the population as an entity that 
encapsulates all the traditionally tripartite powers; and the third one is 
the one that sanctions the truth of the people as unique and exclusive, 
not open to discussion and excluding every other possibility. There 
are other populism’s core characteristics, namely racism and the 
wide use of scapegoat strategy. These two aspects are interesting 
in the perspective of this book because, as we claimed before, the 
propulsion of populism is its overt and undeniable racism, based on 
scapegoat strategy. Thus, Hassan makes the scapegoat as the core of 
her interesting reflections, where a scapegoat can be a member of 
a group, a minority, an organisation or an institution that is always 
blamed for the failure of a social, political or cultural mechanism. In 
this way, social conflict between members of a society is avoided.
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